On August 21, 2024, Iranian President Masoud Bazshakian's entire cabinet, comprising 19 ministers, received a vote of confidence from the parliament. This marks the first occasion in over two decades that an Iranian president has succeeded in securing parliamentary approval for all his ministers since the tenure of former President Mohammad Khatami.
The formation of Bazshakian's government has stirred controversy, with dissatisfaction and criticism emanating from both reformists and the president's own allies, even before the conservatives expressed their views. Despite these criticisms, none of the ministers' eligibility was compromised in the parliament, which is predominantly controlled by conservatives. This outcome was largely due to the backing of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, for the government. In this context, it is crucial to consider the implications of the new cabinet formation and its potential impact on Bazshakian's government's policies regarding both domestic and foreign issues in the forthcoming period.
Parliament's Vote of Confidence
The Iranian parliament recently granted its vote of confidence to the cabinet proposed by President Bazshakian, following intense discussions aimed at assessing the qualifications of each minister. This decision was made during the session held on August 21, where the president delivered a speech emphasizing the necessity of parliamentary consensus for forming the new government, which had already received the endorsement of Khamenei.
Out of the 290 members, 285 participated in the vote. Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh emerged with the highest number of votes, securing 281 in favor. In contrast, Health Minister Mohammad Reza Zafarghandi received the lowest, with 163 votes. Other key ministers also garnered significant support: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi with 247 votes, Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib with 261, Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni with 259, and Minister of Culture Abbas Salehi with 272 votes. It is noteworthy that any proposed minister must secure the confidence of at least half of the parliament members, equating to 145 votes.
The parliament's vote of confidence came after several defenses by President Pezeshkian, amidst speculations that four ministers—responsible for health, labor and welfare, economy, and cultural heritage and tourism—might not secure the vote. During these defenses, Pezeshkian underscored that the proposed ministers had the backing of security institutions and the Revolutionary Guard. However, his repeated need to defend his cabinet before the parliament led to expressions of frustration over the delay in the vote of confidence. He remarked, "Why are you forcing me to say things I shouldn't have to say?"—a reference to his direct assurance of the supreme leader's approval of the cabinet members.
Pezeshkian clarified that the foreign minister was the first to receive Khamenei's approval and that the supreme leader had confirmed the participation of Farzaneh Sadegh, the nominee for the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development, in the government. Furthermore, Pezeshkian revealed that Abbas Salehi, initially reluctant to accept the position of Minister of Culture, was personally instructed by the supreme leader to join the government.
Criticisms of the Government
Pezeshkian's new government faced significant criticism, especially from the reformist faction. A notable development was the resignation of one of the president's key allies, former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, from his position as Vice President for Strategic Affairs. This role, created by Pezeshkian, aimed to utilize Zarif's expertise and reward his steadfast support during the election campaign. Zarif expressed dissatisfaction with the cabinet presented to parliament. Meanwhile, conservatives also voiced their disapproval and their parliamentary representatives attempted to obstruct the ministers from securing votes of confidence. In summary, the most prominent criticisms of Pezeshkian's 14th Iranian government include:
1. Pressure in the name of the Supreme Leader:
Pezeshkian repeatedly invoked the supreme leader's name in his parliamentary speeches to underscore Khamenei's endorsement of all cabinet members. This was perceived by lawmakers as an attempt to pressure them into granting the government a vote of confidence. Conservative MP Malek Shariati articulated this concern, stating, "The president's use of the supreme leader's support to secure parliamentary confidence was a significant error. It positioned the parliament against the supreme leader's selections and fostered a future lack of accountability among government members."
2. A Government without change:
Despite Pezeshkian’s campaign promises to establish a government of change that would address Iran's current challenges, the most significant criticism of his new cabinet is the lack of noticeable change. This is particularly evident in the retention of three ministers from the late President Ebrahim Raisi's administration, including those overseeing intelligence and media, as well as five ministers from former President Hassan Rouhani's government. Moreover, the cabinet comprises eight conservatives, leading reformist and moderate newspapers to voice their criticism.
For instance, the moderate newspaper Jomhouri e-Eslami, in its August 12 editorial, argued that Pezeshkian's cabinet cannot be described as a "new government." The editorial claimed that the new lineup clearly reflects the influence of the supreme leader, aiming to maintain the status quo and continue along the path set by Raisi's government, without implementing the changes Pezeshkian had promised. Similarly, the reformist newspaper Etemad criticized the ministerial selection process, highlighting Pezeshkian's confirmation in his parliamentary speeches that names were submitted to security and intelligence agencies. The newspaper contended that this practice does not indicate any shift in the approach to appointing ministers.
3- Absence of youth and minorities:
Pezeshkian promised that his new government would serve as a "national consensus government," representing the youth, women, and minorities. This pledge aligned with the earlier announcements by Javad Zarif, who, before resigning from his position as vice president for strategic affairs and head of the "Strategic Council for Transition," emphasized the council's agreement. This agreement was to nominate ministers and advise the president on selecting government members, stipulating that ministers should not be over 60 years old and should include new faces from the youth, women, and minorities.
However, the reality diverged from these promises. The government formation lacked young members, with most ministers being over 60 years old. Notably, there was only one woman in the cabinet—Farzaneh Sadeq, the Minister of Roads—making her the second female minister in Iranian governments since the Islamic Revolution. The first was Marzieh Vahid-Dastjerdi, appointed as minister of health in September 2009 during former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second term.
In addition, the new government formation failed to include representation for the Sunni community, contradicting Pezeshkian's promises. Although Emad Hosseini, a Sunni, was named as a candidate for the ministry of oil, reformist media outlets demanded an explanation from the president regarding the absence of a Sunni minister. This absence raised questions about whether Pezeshkian considered it unnecessary to include a Sunni representative, especially at a time when Tehran is threatening retaliation for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau. The newspaper Etemad observed that while the new government formation might partially address divisions within the ruling system, it cannot bridge the gap between the people and the government.
Despite lacking consensus from either the conservative or reformist factions, as neither holds full control over the government, the new cabinet will continue to face criticism. This scrutiny persists even though all members of the cabinet received parliamentary approval. Ironically, the last Iranian president to have his entire proposed cabinet approved by the parliament was the reformist Mohammad Khatami. In contrast, parliament previously refused to grant confidence to several nominees under different administrations: four under the hardliner Ahmadinejad, three under the moderate Rouhani, and one in the late Raisi's government.
This situation underscores a significant trend: reformist presidents often anticipate potential confrontations with hardline elements entrenched within the state's institutions. Consequently, they tend to prioritize securing a degree of consensus to preemptively mitigate potential challenges.
Limited Influence
Despite the acknowledgment that the new cabinet did not receive consensus from both the conservative and reformist camps—due to neither having full control over the government—the debate over its members will likely persist. This is true even though the entire cabinet secured the confidence of the parliament. A clear paradox emerges: the last Iranian president whose proposed government received full parliamentary confidence was the reformist Mohammad Khatami. In contrast, the parliament refused to grant confidence to four nominees in the hardliner Ahmadinejad’s government, three in the moderate Rouhani's government, and one in the late Raisi's government. This pattern suggests that reformist presidents typically anticipate potential confrontations with the hardliner faction entrenched in the state's institutions. Therefore, they strive to build a foundation of consensus to preemptively manage any obstacles.
In this context, Pezeshkian, in his speeches before the parliament, affirmed his readiness to make concessions for the sake of consensus, stating: "I had ideal candidates in mind, but when I saw that there was no agreement on them, I stepped back." He added, "Agreement is more important to me than ideal candidates," pledging to "move forward in unity."
Pezeshkian's retreat from supporting the names proposed by Zarif culminated in Zarif's resignation, which he announced to the Iranian public via his X page just ten days after being appointed vice president for strategic affairs. Zarif acknowledged his inability to fulfill his promises, leading to his decision to step down. Despite losing Zarif, a key ally, Pezeshkian managed to secure the parliament's consensus to initiate his government’s operations. This development occurs amidst a backdrop of significant internal and external challenges confronting the Iranian regime, alongside obstacles for the new president, whose powers are notably constrained by influential entities outside the government.
An analysis published by The Wall Street Journal on July 6, titled "Iran’s Voters Elect First Reformist President in Two Decades," posits that Khamenei’s decision to permit a reformist candidate to win the presidential election—marking the first such victory since Mohammad Khatami two decades ago—signals a shift towards a safer choice by the Iranian regime. This strategic move follows a prolonged period of reformist exclusion and conservative dominance, which has led to major political and social crises, most visibly through the protests in Iran in September 2022.
Overall, the current reformist president faces significant challenges in breaking free from the conservative system's grip or escaping the Supreme Leader's shadow. From the outset, the Supreme Leader allowed a reformist candidate for the presidency, pre-approved all government members, and even participated in its formation, as Pezeshkian has acknowledged on several occasions. This influence is particularly significant given that the selection of key ministries—such as intelligence, foreign affairs, interior, defense, and oil—traditionally falls within the Supreme Leader's purview.
Despite these constraints, there are positive indicators in the new government formation. Notably, the appointment of Abbas Araghchi as Foreign Minister and the reformist Zahra Behrouz Azar as Vice President for Women and Family Affairs suggest a potential for easing both external and internal pressures on the Iranian regime through more flexible policies. Araghchi's confirmation as Foreign Minister is noteworthy, given his role in the 2015 nuclear agreement and his potential efforts to mitigate sanctions on Tehran, especially since he remains committed to the Supreme Leader’s foreign policy directives. Consequently, Araghchi’s appointment could reflect the current government's desire to resume negotiations with the United States and the West, as improving the economic situation hinges on resolving the crisis with Washington and lifting sanctions on Tehran.
Meanwhile, Zahra Behrouz Azar’s role as Vice President for Women and Family Affairs is contingent on her ability to address the anger of women and families affected by the morality police's policies. This task is especially critical given the recent resurgence of violent practices by the morality police, highlighted by a recently circulated video showing the brutal beating and dragging of two young women, one of whom is only 14 years old, followed by their arrest. This incident occurs despite Pezeshkian's pledge to dismantle this police unit and seek alternative ways to encourage women to adhere to the hijab.
Regarding major issues such as the conflict with Israel, the government's influence on decision-making remains weaker compared to the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard leadership. In this context, a report by the British newspaper The Telegraph on August 9 highlights the new Iranian president's struggle against the hard-line Revolutionary Guard Corps to prevent an all-out war with Israel. While the Revolutionary Guard advocates for a broad and direct missile attack on Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, as well as targeting military facilities, Pezeshkian prefers to strike at Israeli bases scattered throughout the region. Ultimately, the final decision on how and when Iran will respond rests with Khamenei.
In conclusion, the fundamental reality of the Iranian system remains unchanged: the supreme leader is the primary architect of both domestic and foreign policy. Even with a reformist president leading the executive branch, the core approach of the ruling system persists. However, this may result in the adoption of more adaptable strategies to achieve its largely consistent goals.
